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In the wake of the still ongoing global financial crisis, bank interdependencies have come into focus
in trying to assess linkages among banks and systemic risk. To date, such analysis has largely
been based on numerical data. By contrast, this study attempts to gain further insight into bank
interconnections by tapping into financial discourse. We present a text-to-network process, which
has its basis in co-occurrences of bank names and can be analyzed quantitatively and visualized. To
quantify bank importance, we propose an information centrality measure to rank and assess trends
of bank centrality in discussion. For qualitative assessment of bank networks, we put forward a
visual, interactive interface for better illustrating network structures. We illustrate the text-based
approach on European Large and Complex Banking Groups (LCBGs) during the ongoing financial
crisis by quantifying bank interrelations and centrality from discussion in 3M news articles, spanning
2007Q1 to 2014Q3.
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1. Introduction
The global financial crisis has brought several banks, not to say entire banking sectors, to the
verge of collapse. This has not only resulted in losses for investors, but also costs for the real economy
and welfare at large. Considering the costs of banking crises, the recent focus of research on financial
instabilities is well-motivated. First, real costs of systemic banking crises have been estimated to
average at around 20–25% of GDP (e.g., [15, 23]). Second, data from the European Commission
illustrate that government support for stabilizing banks in the European Union (EU) peaked at the
end of 2009. The support amounted to Euro 1.5 trl, which is more than 13% of EU GDP. The still
ongoing financial crisis has stimulated a particular interest in systemic risk measurement through
linkages, interrelations, and interdependencies among banks. This paper advances the literature by
providing a novel measure of bank linkages from text and bank importance through information
centrality.
Most common sources for describing bank interdependencies and networks are based upon nu-
merical data like interbank asset and liability exposures or payment flows, and co-movements in
market data (e.g., equity prices, CDS spreads, and bond spreads) (see [13]). While these direct
and indirect linkages complement each other, they exhibit a range of limitations. Even though in
an ideal world bank networks ought to be assessed through direct, real linkages, interbank data
between banks’ balance sheets are mostly not publicly disclosed. In many cases, even regulators
have access to only partial information, such as lack of data on pan-European bank linkages despite
high financial integration. In this vein, a commonly used source of data descends from interbank
payment systems (see [33]), but is again only accessible for a limited set of regulators. It is also
worth to note that real exposures, as they are measured for individual markets, are oftentimes
highly biased towards the business model of a bank, such as investment or depository functions.
Market price data, while being widely available and capturing other contagion channels than those
in direct linkages between banks [1], assume that asset prices correctly reflect all publicly available
information on bank risks, exposures and interconnections. Yet, it has repeatedly been shown that
securities markets are not always efficient in reflecting information about stocks (e.g. [24]). Further,
co-movement-based approaches, such as that by Hautsch et al [20], require large amounts of data,
often invoking reliance on historical experience, which may not represent the interrelations of today.
Also, market prices are most often contemporaneous, rather than leading indicators, particularly
when assessing tail risk. It is neither an entirely straightforward task to separate the factors driving
market prices in order to observe bilateral interdependence [9].
Big data has emerged as a central theme in analytics during the past years. Research questions
of big data analytics arise not only from massive volumes of data, or speeds at which data are
constantly generated, but also from the widely varying forms, particularly unstructured textual
data, that in themselves pose challenges in how to effectively and efficiently extract meaningful
information [16]. This paper treats the text mining aspect, as it proposes an approach to relationship
assessment among banks by analyzing how they are mentioned together in financial discourse, such
as news, official reports, discussion forums, etc. The idea of analyzing relations in text is in itself
simple, but widely applicable. It has been explored in various areas; for instance, O¨zgu¨r et al. [29]
study co-occurrences of person names in news, and Wren et al. [37] extract biologically relevant
relations from research articles. These approaches can be used to construct social or biological
networks, using text as the intermediate medium of information. Our contribution lies in proposing
this text-based approach to the study of bank interrelations, with emphasis on analysis of the
resulting bank network models and ultimately quantifying a bank’s importance or centrality.
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Our approach may be compared to the above discussed, more established ways of quantifying
bank interdependence, such as interbank lending and co-movement in market data. While not
measuring direct interdependence, it has the advantage over interbank exposures by relying upon
widely available data, and over co-movements in market data by being a more direct measure of an
interrelation. By contrast, our approach serves to shed light on banks’ relationships in the view of
public discussion, or of information overall, depending on the scope of textual data. It may serve as
a way of tapping into the wisdom of the crowd, while offering a perspective different from previous
methods, especially considering the presence of rich, embedded contextual detail. Rather than an
ending point, this sets a starting point from which further study may focus more extensively on the
context of occurrences and more sophisticated semantic analysis. This allows to better understand
factors driving interrelations, and overall centrality.
In this paper, we assess European Large and Complex Banking Groups (LCBGs) using the text-
based approach for quantifying bank interrelations from discussion in the news. A co-occurrence
network is derived from 3 million articles, published during 2007Q1 to 2014Q3 in the Reuters online
news archive. Beyond only quantifying bank interrelations, we also provide means for quantitative
and qualitative assessment of networks. To support quantification of bank importance, we propose
an information centrality measure to rank and assess trends of bank centrality in discussion, which
relates to the information channel in the analysis of interconnected, and potentially systemic, finan-
cial risk. In contrast to common shortest-path-based centrality measures, information centrality
captures effects that might propagate aimlessly by accounting for parallel paths. Thus, rather than
direct financial exposures, we provide a representation of the channel for potential informational
contagion, as well as other common factors leading to co-occurrence in discussion, such as overlap-
ping portfolios and exposure to common exogenous shocks. To support a qualitative assessment
of the bank networks, we put forward a visual, interactive interface for better illustrating network
structures. This concerns not only an interface to network models, but also an interactive plot to
better communicate quantitative network measures.1
The co-occurrence network illustrates relative prominence of individual banks, and segments of
more closely related banks. The systemic view acknowledges that the centrality of a bank in the
network is a sign of importance, and not necessarily its size (cf. too central to fail by Battistone
et al. [4]). The dynamics of the network, both local and global, reflect real-world events over time.
The network can also be utilized as an exploratory tool that provides an overview of a large set of
data, while the underlying text can be retrieved for more qualitative analysis of relations.
To better understand what drives information centrality, and how it ought to be interpreted,
we explore determinants of the centrality measure. We investigate a large number of bank-specific
risk drivers, as well as country-specific macro-financial and banking sector variables, as well as
control for variables measuring bank size. Further, we also assess the extent to which information
centrality explains banks’ risk to go bad, and compare it to more standard measures of size. Even
though bank size is a key factor explaining information centrality, we show that centrality is not a
direct measure of vulnerability. This implies that the centrality measure is not biased by the nature
of business activities or models, which potentially impacts bank vulnerability (e.g., asset size or
interbank-lending centrality). Rather than a narrow, direct measure of interconnectedness, we are
capturing systemic importance of a bank more broadly, in terms of connectivity expressed in finan-
1The interactive interfaces are provided as web-based implementations: http://risklab.fi/demo/textnet/. For a
further discussion of the VisRisk platform see Sarlin [32].
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Figure 1: Volumes of all news articles and bank name occurrences over time.
cial discourse. Yet, while the rich nature of textual data provides possibilities to more specifically
query and define interrelationships and other potentially interesting details on banks, interpreting
the semantics by computational methods is often challenging. To this end, we also discuss different
ways of analyzing text-based networks, laying forward some ideas on future directions in their study.
The following section explains the data and methods we use to construct and analyze bank
networks from text, whereas Section 3 discusses the results of the experiments on textual data,
including both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Before a concluding discussion on text-based
networks, Section 4 assesses determinants of information centrality.
2. Bank networks from text: Data and methods
This section provides a discussion of the text-to-network process, both generally and from the
viewpoint of the study in this paper. First, we detail the particular text data and choice of banks
to be studied. Having established this, we turn to the process of text analysis and construction
of bank co-occurrence networks. This is followed by discussion on the analysis of such networks,
including both quantitative and qualitative analysis.
2.1. Data and target banks
Through digitized economic, social and academic activities, we are having access to ever in-
creasing amounts of textual data. While vast amounts of textual data are readily available, there
is nothing that assures increases in precision and quality of data. Analytics of big data is increas-
ingly a search for needles in haystacks, where choices in data source, collection methods as well as
pre-processing setups all need to be carefully directed in order to pick up desired signals. Likewise,
when tapping into financial discourse, one needs to clearly narrow the context of collected data and
targeted entities of interest, beyond the choice of data source.
The text data we use in this paper is newly collected from Reuters online news archive. News
text presents a rather formal type of discourse, which eases interpretation of extracted relations, as
4
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Figure 2: Text-to-network process: (1) Occurrences of bank names are detected in source text, (2) pair-wise co-
occurrence relations are extracted between occurrences within a context, and (3) relations aggregated over a time
interval form a co-occurrence network. A resulting network can be analyzed with (4a) quantitative measures capturing
some interesting features, and (4b) qualitative analysis through visual exploration of the network, its neighborhoods,
and connectivity of individual nodes.
opposed to more free-form, user-generated online discussion as explored in earlier work by Ro¨nnqvist
and Sarlin [30]. We focus on major consumer banks within Europe, classified by the European
Central Bank [18] as Large and Complex Banking Groups (LCBGs), of which 15 are also classified
as Globally Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) by the Financial Stability Board [19]. See
Table A.1 in the Appendix for a list of LCBGs and G-SIBs and the naming convention used in this
paper. The period of study is 2007Q1–2014Q3, for which the news archive contains 6.7M articles.
We base our analysis on a 45% random sample of articles comprising of 3.0M articles (1.5B words).
The text analysis is based on detecting mentions of bank names in the articles. We look at a
set of 27 banks: 5 British, 5 French, 4 German, 4 Spanish, 3 Dutch, 2 Italian, 2 Swiss, 1 Swedish
and 1 Danish bank. In order to mitigate a geographical sampling bias, we use the U.S. edition of
the Reuters news archive, as no single European edition is available, but rather national editions
for only the largest countries.
The chart in Figure 1 provides an overview of the trends in total news article volume, as well as
the volume of bank name occurrences. Out of all articles, 5.4% mention any of the targeted banks,
on average. The volume is relatively low in the beginning of 2007, i.e., the start of the archive.
Mentions of banks reaches a peak in early 2008, after which it fluctuates between 60k and 110k
articles per quarter.
2.2. From text to bank networks
With plain text as a starting point, and relationship assessment as an objective, we analyze
co-mentions in financial discourse. Extracting occurrences and co-occurrences from text is the
initial step. The relationships are constituents of co-occurrence networks, whose properties can be
assessed through both quantitative and visual analysis. Figure 2 provides an overview of the process
of transforming text into network models that lend themselves to analysis.
To construct the network we scan the text for occurrences of bank names to detect and register
mentions of those banks. Scanning is performed using patterns manually designed and tested
to match with as high accuracy as possible. Generally, the use of manually designed patterns
for information extraction in text tend to have high precision but lower recall, but we expect
that the reasonably standardized form of discourse we use should mitigate a loss in recall. The
pattern for each bank is specified as a set of regular expressions targeting common naming variants
such as full name, abbreviations, synonymous names, names of subsidiaries, historical names and
spelling variations. The regular expressions are developed and tested iteratively on data to optimize
accuracy, going from broader patterns toward higher precision with retained recall.
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Co-occurrence analysis is computationally very efficient and versatile in terms of language, com-
pared to more technically sophisticated relation extraction techniques (e.g., based on dependency
parsing [12]), while it offers worse precision of relations. Using co-occurrence-based relation extrac-
tion lets us process billions of words on standard architecture serially in the order of hours, and
we assume the substantial data volume to partially compensate for the noisier relation extraction.
The framework is language independent and works equally well on English language news as, for
instance, on Finnish online discussion [30].
A co-occurrence relation is formed by two bank names occurring in the same context. In the
present case, we define the scope of the context as a 400-character sliding window in the text,
whereas a wider scope would require less data but increase noise as any co-occurrence is less likely
to represent a meaningful relation. In the process, a context is checked for co-occurrence candidates
as follows. A context is scanned for substrings matching the defined regular expressions, and a bank
occurrence is registered by associating the matching pattern with its corresponding bank. Multiple
occurrences of a single bank are counted only once per context, ignoring presumed meaningless
repetitions, but an occurrence may participate in multiple relations. A context containing two or
more banks yields one or more pair-wise co-occurrence relations. Thus, derived from the set of
matches M ⊂ N (indexed by bank) in context c, we define the set of co-occurrence relations R as:
Rc = {r | r ∈Mc ×Mc ∧ r1 < r2}
However, we disqualify contexts with more than 5 banks, as they are likely to be listings that
would result in marginally meaningful relations. These design decisions should be adjusted and
tested for each new data source, to obtain less noisy results.
We aggregate co-occurrences over time to form links that are weighted by the absolute co-
occurrence count during a period (e.g., a quarter). These links form a dynamic network, a series
of cross-sectional networks, which allows the extracted relations to be studied using methods for
analysis of complex networks. In the network, banks form nodes (or vertices), and aggregated co-
occurrence relations form their links (or edges). To extract meaningful quantitative measures of
co-occurrence networks, measures designed for weighted networks need to be used. Nevertheless,
most conventional network analysis methods are designed for binary (unweighted) networks only
[28], which calls for some form of transformation of the network if these measures are to be used,
such as by filtering out very weak connections. While unfiltered networks are more sensitive to
noise when using binary measures, low-frequency co-occurrences may be of particular interest, as
they are more likely to represent novel information. In order not to lose detail, it is highly moti-
vated to use weighted networks and measures that account for link weights. Larger sample size or
longer aggregation intervals increase the co-occurrence count, i.e., the weights of the cross-sectional
networks, and will affect many network measures (including information centrality discussed later);
as the networks are directly comparable among cross sections this is however not an issue.
Although quantitative analysis of networks provides means to better understand overall prop-
erties of networks, they as any aggregate measure most often lack in detail. Hence, network visual-
ization supports not only detailed analysis of network structure and constituents, but also further
details as demanded. In the following subsection, we further discuss both quantitative measurement
of network properties and visualization as a support in their analysis.
2.3. Network analysis
Network models are commonly rather complex and rich in information. They can be analyzed
in many different ways to gain insight into the nature of the underlying phenomenon, the bank
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connectivity landscape in our case. We first discuss analysis of the networks at a global, descriptive
level, to describe properties of the co-occurrence networks through common network measures.
Later, we concentrate on the concept of centrality and a few ways of quantifying it in our type of
network, with the study of systemic risk in mind. Finally, we discuss network visualization as a
means for interactive exploration.
Global properties
A commonly cited property of real-world networks is that the average distance between nodes is
very small relative to the size of the network, lending them the name ”small-world” networks [36].
Short distances have a functional justification in most types of network, as it increases efficiency
of communication, while there also is a general tendency towards short average distances among
non-regular networks. These networks have varying degree, i.e., number of links per node, the
distribution of which is a typical way of profiling empirical networks. Networks that have evolved
through natural, self-organizing processes, such as communications, social, biological and financial
networks, tend to exhibit degree distributions that follow a power law. These so-called scale-
free networks evolve through processes of preferential attachment, where the likelihood of a node
receiving a new link is proportional to its current degree [2].
Jackson & Rogers [21] distinguish two archetypes of natural networks, described by power-law
degree distributions and exponential degree distributions, respectively. They argue that, in fact,
empirical networks generally exhibit hybrid distributions, between power-law and exponential, as
they are formed through mixed processes of preferential attachment and attachment with uniform
probability. The latter process still generates highly heterogeneous exponential distributions, as
established nodes have greater chance over time at growing well embedded into the network. By
either process, some nodes are bound to be more influential than others, and mapping the levels
of influence in the system is our main interest. To profile the co-occurrence networks, the average
shortest paths and degree distributions can indicate how small-world and scale-free they are. In
the latter case, as we are interested in accounting for the link weighting, we study the distribution
of strength, i.e., weighted degree calculated as the sum of weights per node (as [3] propose).
Other typical ways of characterizing structure focus on network density and modularity. For
instance, a clustering coefficient can measure the probability that triplets of connected nodes in bi-
nary networks form triangles, providing a measure of density that can be conditioned on degree, etc.
Networks may consist of several modules or communities, i.e., subnetworks more densely connected
to eachother than to other parts. Although such characteristics can be studied by quantitative
means, it is not of particular interest for the current news-based bank networks. However, we will
briefly consider these qualities based on visual analysis in Subsection 3.2.
Centrality
Following the initial profiling of the whole network, we turn the focus toward the concept of
node centrality. A central node holds a generally influential position in a network; a centrally
located bank is likely to be systemically important, as it stands to affect a large part of the network
directly or indirectly in case of a shock (negative or positive). There is, however, a range of
ways to quantify centrality, the most common measures being degree centrality (i.e., fraction of
nodes directly linked) and the shortest-path-based closeness centrality and betweenness centrality.
We adapt degree centrality to our weighted networks, by using strength as a direct measure of
centrality. Closeness and betweenness centrality can also incorporate link weight into the calculation
of shortest path, by means of the Dijkstra’s shortest-path algorithm [17] that interprets weights as
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distances between nodes. Since co-occurrence networks represent tighter connections (i.e., more co-
occurrences) by higher weights, it is necessary to invert the weights before calculation, as proposed
by [27].
Borgatti [8] points out that a common mistake in the study of network centrality is to neglect to
consider how flow in the system is best modeled. The common shortest-path-based centrality mea-
sures make implicit assumptions that whatever is passing from a node to the surrounding network
does so along optimal paths, such as in routing networks of goods and targeted communication.
Arguably, a more realistic intuition for influence of a node, in cases where effects might propagate
aimlessly, such as any type of contagion, is one that accounts for parallel paths that may exist.
Along these lines, we study a closeness centrality measure that models the flow of information
in such a manner, called information centrality [34] (also known as current flow closeness centrality
[11]). Information centrality, which seeks to quantify the information that can pass from a node to
the network over links whose strength determine level of loss in transmission, is defined as
I(i) =
n
nCii +
∑n
j=1 Cjj − 2
∑n
j=1 Cij
(1)
where n is the number of nodes and the weighted pseudo-adjacency matrix is defined as
C = B−1, Bij =
{
1 + S(i), if i = j
1− wij , otherwise
where w is link weight (0 for unlinked nodes) and S(i) is strength of node i. This allows us to
measure the centrality or influence of bank i in public discourse, which relates to a very general-
purpose measure of connectedness in discussion. When relating to systemic risk, we aim at capturing
the information channel when analyzing interconnected financial risk. Thus, rather than direct
financial exposures, we provide a representation of the channel for potential informational contagion,
as well as other common factors leading to co-occurrence in discussion, such as overlapping portfolios
and exposure to common exogenous shocks.
Centrality as a measure of a node’s relative importance is interesting, yet changes in centrality
adds another dimension. We study networks of quarterly cross sections of the data, in order to
calculate and compare centralities over time.
When the data is split by shorter intervals less frequent parts will inevitably become discon-
nected from the main network component. Information centrality is quite sensitive to the resulting
fluctuations in component size, while the more central nodes start to correlate strongly. We pro-
pose a method to stabilize the centrality measurement by applying Laplace smoothing to the link
weights before calculation of information centrality. The weight of each existing link is increased
by a small constant (e.g. 1.0), while links are added between all other nodes and weighted by the
same constant. Formally, w′ij = wij +α, where wij = 0 if i and j are not connected. The reasoning
is that operating on a limited sample of links, we want to discount some probability for unobserved
links (between known nodes), to lessen the influence that the difference between non-occurring
(unobserved) links and single-occurrence links has on centrality. This type of additive smoothing
has similarly been applied in language modeling [14], but is generally applicable to smoothing of
categorical data.
The choice of the smoothing parameter α is dependent on the study objective: modest levels
(e.g., 0.1) retain more information on global changes in centrality, whereas higher levels (e.g., 1.0 or
more) accentuate relative differences among nodes. Subsection 3.1 discusses the effects of different
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levels of smoothing, based on visual assessment as well as measures of variance. On the one hand,
the effect of smoothing can be quantified through the average variance in information centrality per
node over time periods (T ):
V =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
(I ′t(i)− µi)2
)
(2)
where µi is mean node centrality over time and I’ is smoothed and min-max normalized I
over all t and i. This variance should decrease with increased smoothing. On the other hand, the
relative spread of nodes that is expected to increase with higher levels of smoothing can be similarly
measured based on variance among nodes in a cross section, rather than among cross sections for a
node. The average is then formulated as:
V ′ =
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(I ′t(i)− µi)2
)
(3)
Visual analysis
While quantitative network analysis plays a vital role in measuring specific aspects of interest in
a precise and comparable fashion, network visualization can provide useful overview and exploratory
capabilities, communicating general structure as well as local patterns of connectivity. The visual
analytics paradigm aims at supporting analytical thinking through interactive visualization, where
interaction is the operative term [22]. Through a tight integration between the user and the data
model, users are enabled to explore and reason about the data. In the case of our dynamic networks,
interaction capabilities for navigating between cross sections and further exploring network structure
provide a setting for qualitative analysis of the information-rich models.
Force-directed layouting is often used to apply spatialization of network nodes, that is, to place
the nodes in a way that overall approximates node distances to their corresponding link strengths,
thereby seeking to uncover the structure of the network in terms of more and less densely connected
areas and their relation. Still, force-directed layouts quickly turn uninformative or ambiguous as the
networks become too dense, including cases of weighted networks with few strong but many weak
connections. Although network visualization with force-directed layouting often does not scale well
to analysis of big networks, it still can be a useful tool when used properly. In the case of our bank
co-occurrence network it produces decent visualizations for cross sections of the data set, while
stricter filtering of co-occurrences will produce a more sparse network that is less cluttered. We use
the D3 force algorithm [10] for layouting.
The dynamics of the network can be studied by visualizing cross-sectional networks in a series,
where the positioning is initialized by the previous step and optimized according to the current
linkage, as to provide continuity that helps in the visual exploration of network evolution. User
interaction plays a vital role not only by allowing to navigate across time, but also by allowing
interaction with the positioning algorithm, letting the user acquire a more direct understanding of
the structures and details in the data. Force-directed layouting on more densely linked networks
generally finds a locally optimal positioning out of a large number of comparably good solutions.
Interaction that lets the user drag nodes to reposition them and a force-directed algorithm that helps
to counter-optimize the positioning immediately afterwards gives rise to a collaborative, exploratory
way of working with and understanding the data.
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Nevertheless, the best setting for visual analysis might be one that combines with quantitative
analysis, encoding them visually. For instance, centrality measures can be encoded by node size to
enhance the communication of structure provided by network visualization, which can use force-
directed layouting or other more regularly structured layouts.
3. Centrality: Quantitative and qualitative analysis
This section describes the co-occurrence networks from both a viewpoint of quantitative mea-
sures and exploratory visualization. Starting with network measures, we describe network properties
in general and information centrality in particular. Then, we turn to visual analysis of the networks
and their constituents.
3.1. Quantitative analysis
The volume of bank occurrences is rather stable, apart from a peak centered around 2008Q1
and some fluctuation from 2012 onward. In 2008 the peak in occurrence volume coincides with a
peak in total article volume, unlike later during the studied time span when occurrence seems less
affected by fluctuating article volume. Interestingly, the 2008 surge in occurrences barely translates
into a rise in co-occurrences (or strength), i.e., even though banks are more discussed at the time
prior to the outbreak of the crisis, they are not discussed considerably more in close connection to
each other. Overall, total article volume and bank occurrences have a Pearson correlation of 0.745.
Occurrences and co-occurrences have a correlation of 0.835, which indicates that there is a notable
component to co-occurrence volume which is not simply explained by occurrence volume.
From these aggregated counts, we continue by studying the data as a network. As discussed
in Section 2.3, empirical networks are typically profiled through measures describing certain global
properties. The average distance, in terms of number of links, between nodes in the co-occurrence
networks are certainly small, at 1.1–1.3, and would justify calling them ’small-world’ networks.
However, with weighted links, a measure of average distance becomes hardly interpretable. While
it is clear that our networks are very tightly connected, the strength distribution depicts the relative
differences in node connectivity. Many empirical networks exhibit power-law distributed degree or
strength, as a sign of evolution through preferential attachment. Figure 3 shows the cumulative
strength distribution of the aggregated network for the entire period, as well as a closely fitted expo-
nential function that hints that our network is exceedingly a product of evolution through uniform
attachment. Still, we are able to partially fit power-law functions to the distribution, as the figure
highlights with straight lines, which could indicate a hybrid model with a weak preferential attach-
ment component as well. The strength distribution illustrates the high heterogeneity of connections
in the network, i.e., some banks are much more associated in discussion than others. However, in
order to gain a deeper understanding of a bank’s importance to the wider network, we need to look
beyond immediate connections as measured by degree/strength distribution or degree/strength cen-
trality (proportional to co-occurrence volume), namely we need to look at information centrality.
We study information centrality for each node over time, using different levels of Laplace smooth-
ing (ranging from 0.0 to 5.0). Figure 4 plots the information centrality values, with a number of
example banks highlighted in color and representative α values. Comparing information central-
ity with and without smoothing visually, we see that different peaks are pronounced: some minor
peaks (e.g., during 2009Q2-2011Q4) subside while others (e.g., prior to 2008Q3 and crisis breakout)
are substantially amplified even at low levels of smoothing. Based on its rationale, we interpret
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Figure 3: Cumulative strength distribution (weighted degree) of bank co-occurrence network during 2007Q1–2014Q3,
showing probability p over node strength x against the upper bound on strength s. Dashed line is a fitted exponential
function. Solid straight lines indicate locally fitting power-law functions.
that smoothing helps highlight meaningful patterns in information centrality dynamics and gener-
ally stabilize the series, while reducing artifacts of changing network size. At higher levels (e.g.,
α = 1.0), peaks become relatively weaker as the distribution of banks evens out on the information
centrality scale, so that fewer banks flock at the very top. We aim to measures these respective
qualities as V and V’ in Equations 2 and 3.
The average variance over time V is stationary for very low values of α, with the expected
decrease starting at α = 0.2 (11% drop from unsmoothed V =0.027) and continuing monotonously
with stronger smoothing, directly reflecting its stabilizing nature. Meanwhile, V’ signals an in-
creased spread among banks already at α = 0.01 (21% over unsmoothed V ’=0.025), which reaches
a maximum at α = 1.0 (94% increase). We conclude that α levels at or slightly above 0.2 are
suitable to achieve moderate smoothing that communicates global changes of centrality in this
network, whereas 1.0 appears to be the optimal choice when focusing on relative differences in
centrality among banks. The regressions in Section 4 use information centrality with smoothing at
α = 1.0, since relative differences in centrality are of particular interest. In our experiments, we
also note that V closely follows measures of average covariance of banks over time, supporting the
observation that stronger smoothing reduces the originally very strong correlation among the most
central banks.
Finally, to test smoothing in relation to sample size, we compare the variance measures when
applied to the above discussed 45% sample set to a 20% sample. As Laplace smoothing is a method
to mitigate effects of limited sample sizes, we expect relatively stronger effects when applied to a
smaller sample. Indeed, α = 0.1 results in a 47% drop in V (from 0.03 at α = 0.0) at 20% sampling,
while higher alpha only has marginal decreasing impact. Even a small α has a strong stabilizing
effect on the smaller sample, which in this case contains 1.3M articles. This underlines the fact
that working with text data, typically involving very long-tailed distributions, often benefits from
big data in terms of size to achieve reliable results, and that smoothing methods are practical for
11
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Figure 4: Information centrality for banks over time. The charts show different levels of smoothing: none (α = 0.0),
little (α = 0.2) and moderate (α = 1.0). A few example banks are highlighted (bank labels are described in Table
A.1 in the Appendix).
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Figure 5: Information centrality ranking for all banks in 2014Q3 (bank labels are described in Table A.1 in the
Appendix).
that very reason. In addition, we tested the robustness of information centrality over 10 random
samplings (at 30%, α = {0.0, 0.1, 1.0}) that resulted in standard deviations (relative to the mean
centrality of that smoothing level) of 21.2%, 8.5% and 3.7% respectively, which further highlights
the stabilizing effect of smoothing on sparse data.
The trends of individual banks generally follow the movements of the cross section closely, as
increased connectivity in parts of the network strongly affects the rest, since the co-occurrence
network is generally very tightly connected. Individual centrality relative to the cross section is
generally quite stable. Nevertheless, some changes can be observed that might reflect real-world
events. For instance, ABN AMRO has relatively high information centrality in 2007 that decreases
afterwards. Royal Bank of Scotland is the most central bank in 2007–2008, whereas it later on is
overtaken by, e.g., Barclays and Deutsche Bank. To illustrate the information centrality ranking
between banks in more detail, Figure 5 shows all values as of 2014Q3.
The smoothed information centrality plots exhibit peaks in both 2008Q1 and 2008Q4, as well
13
as during 2012 and 2014Q1. In 2008Q1, for instance, the peak coincides with the peak in bank
occurrence. The fact that co-occurrence stays relatively flat during the same time indicates that
the change in information centrality is not so much due to generally strengthened connections, but
largely due to change in topology. The peak in the fourth quarter likewise hints at topological shifts
following the crisis outbreak, but in this period even bank occurrence is normal. Centralities rise
toward 2012, but have subsided substantially in 2013, then coinciding with a similar sharp decrease
in bank occurrence. Overall, the correlation between co-occurrence volume and raw information
centrality averaged over all nodes is 0.651, hinting at a considerable component other than general
co-occurrence volume that we argue is topological, i.e., involving changes of weight distribution over
links as well as changes in link structure.
3.2. Visual analysis
As a complement to the discussion on quantitative analysis of the co-occurrence networks,
we briefly consider the role of visual network analysis. Our information centrality measurements
highlight an interesting pattern in 2008Q2–Q4 that we inspect further visually. The second and
fourth quarters have relatively high global information centrality, whereas there is a temporary dip
in the third quarter. The networks in Figure 6 show visualized snapshots of each quarter, where
the changes in patterns of connectivity can be studied in more detail. It shows a sparser topology
for Q3 than in both Q2 and Q4, as reflected by the measure. In addition, the visualization allows
for studying local patterns, e.g., how the connection between the two Scandinavian banks Nordea
and Danske Bank (right-side edge of networks) changes.
In general, the networks have a core consisting of the most central banks that does not change
drastically over time. The periphery experiences more topological change, but its banks stay mostly
in their outside positions. Nevertheless, it is hardly possible to define a strict border between
core and periphery, neither by visual inspection nor quantitatively (e.g., by degree or information
centrality), rather the nodes appear on a continuum of centrality (cf. Figure 5). We may interpret
from the force-directed visualization that the network consists of one major module, with the only
exception of occasionally disconnected components or single nodes (e.g., La Caixa and Bankia in
Figure 6b). The network is overall very densely connected in terms of binary links.
Even though visual inspection can provide valuable insight, in many cases, it may be hard
to reliably and precisely compare changes in specific aspects, such as centrality of single nodes
or centralization of the whole network, based on the network visualization. This underlines the
importance of backing visual analysis with quantitative measures, for instance, by encoding node
size with information centrality or presenting plots of measures in parallel, coordinated views.
The combination of both approaches is posed to provide the best possibilities for understanding the
properties of the network, through a mixed process of exploration and focused inspection. The visual
representations in Figure 6 represent information centrality as node size, which in combination with
the force-directed node positioning provides support for visually assessing node centrality in more
general terms.
4. Determinants of information centrality
Analysis thus far attempted to convince that information centrality captures the notion of
system-wide importance of a bank in terms of financial discourse. Yet, little was done to provide
a deeper interpretation of what information centrality signifies. This section explores potential
determinants of information centrality. We explain centrality with a large number of bank-specific
14
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Figure 6: Network visualization for 2008Q2–Q4, each showing current topology and link strengths (encoded as opacity
and logarithmically scaled line width). Node size is relative to information centrality (α = 0.2) and orange color
denotes globally systemically important banks (bank labels are described in Table A.1 in the Appendix).
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risk drivers, as well as country-specific macro-financial and banking sector variables, beyond controls
for bank size. Further, we also assess the extent to which information centrality explains banks’
risk to go bad, and compare it to more standard measures of size.
4.1. Data
We complement the textual data, and therefrom derived centrality measures, with bank-level
data from financial statements and banking-sector and macro-financial indicators at the country
level. This gives us a dataset of 24 risk indicators, spanning 2000Q1 to 2014Q1 for 27 banks, as
well as distress events. The definitions of distressed banks follows Betz et al. [6] and are defined
based upon the following three categories of events:
• Direct bank failures include bankruptcies, liquidations and defaults.
• Government aid events comprise the use of state support on the asset side, such as capital
injections or participation in asset relief programs (i.e., asset protection or asset guarantees).
• Forced mergers capture private sector solutions to bank distress by conditioning mergers with
negative coverage ratios or a parent receiving state aid after a merger.
To measure risk drivers, we make use of CAMELS variables (where the letters refer to Capital
adequacy, Asset quality, Management quality, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to Market Risk).
The Uniform Financial Rating System, informally known as the CAMEL ratings system, was in-
troduced by the US regulators in 1979. Since 1996, the rating system was complemented with
Sensitivity to Market Risk, to be called CAMELS. The literature on individual bank failures draws
heavily on the risk drivers put forward by the CAMELS framework. Further, we complement bank-
level data with country-level indicators of risk. One set of variables describes the banking sector as
an aggregate, whereas another explains macro-financial vulnerabilities in European countries, such
as indicators from the scorecard of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. All bank-specific data
are retrieved from Bloomberg, whereas country-level data comes mainly from Eurostat and ECB
MFI Statistics.
4.2. What explains information centrality?
The essential question we ask herein is whether more central banks perform or behave differently.
Following Bertay et al. [5], who assess whether and to what extent performance, strategy and
market discipline depend on standard bank size measures, we conduct experiments in order to
better understand what signifies information centrality. In contrast to their study, we control for
more standard measures of bank size, in order to capture particular effects of information centrality.
Using the above described data, we make use of standard, linear least squares regression models to
conduct the following experiments (cf. Table 1):
1. Explain information centrality (IC) with bank size variables (Model 1).
2. Explain IC with CAMELS variable groups one-by-one, controlling for bank size (Models 2–7).
3. Explain IC with all CAMELS variables, controlling for bank size (Model 8).
4. Explain IC with CAMELS and country-specific variables, controlling for bank size (Model 9).
Our experiments show a number of patterns about drivers of information centrality. Table 1 sum-
marizes all regression estimates. First, we show that size measures of total assets and total deposits
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statistically significantly explain information centrality. This holds both when included individu-
ally and together in regressions. At a 0.1% level, we can show that these size variables relate to
centrality, which is in accordance with the nature and aim of the measure.
Second, we also add variable groups from the CAMELS framework to assess which risk factors
explain information centrality. When testing groups one-by-one, we find that equity to assets,
cost-to-income ratio and net-short term borrowing are statistically significant at the 5% level, and
loan loss provisions to total loans, reserves to impaired assets, interest expenses to liabilities and
deposits to funding are statistically significant at the 1% level. Large cost-to-income ratios are
expected to reduce individual bank risk, whereas loan loss provisions are expected to increase risk.
Yet, the estimates of the liquidity variables – interest expenses to total liabilities and deposits to
funding – indicate less risk, as more deposits is expected to be negatively and more interest expenses
positively related to bank risk. The relationships of loan loss reserves and share of trading income
are potentially ambiguous, as higher reserves should correspond to a higher cover for expected losses
but could also proxy for higher expected losses and trading income might be related to a riskier
business model as a volatile source of earnings but investment securities are also liquid, allowing to
minimize potential fire sale losses.
Third, when including all size and CAMELS variables, we still find the same variables to be
statistically significant, except for all variables significant at the 5% level (i.e., equity to assets,
cost-to-income ratio and net-short term borrowing). When assessing the size variables, assets
is consistently a significant predictor, whereas deposits turns insignificant in Model 6 when also
including deposits to funding, which is likely to be a result of multicollinearity. Further, the effects
of individual risk indicators are unchanged when excluding all bank size variables, except for slight
changes in significance levels. Fourth, we complement the bank-specific model with country-level
data by also explaining centrality with banking sector and macro-financial variables. Even though
this leads to an improvement of R2 by one third, this leaves most of the effects unchanged. Notably,
liquidity indicators and the cost-to-income ratio remain statistically significant. Out of the country-
specific variables, statistically significant predictors are assets to GDP, non-core liability growth,
loans to deposits, inflation, stock price growth, and sovereign bond yields.
4.3. Information centrality as a risk driver
In the above experiments, we showed that information centrality is partly driven by CAMELS
variables, which generally represent different dimensions of individual bank risk. This does not,
however, necessarily imply that information centrality is a measure of vulnerability. The next
question is whether and to what extent information centrality signals vulnerable banks, particularly
when controlling for CAMELS variables.
As we have distress events for the banks, and the above used risk indicators, we can easily test
the extent to which information centrality aids in identifying vulnerable banks. By focusing on
vulnerable rather than distressed banks, we are interested in periods that precede distress events
(e.g., 24 months). In this case, we make use of standard logistic regression to attain a predicted
probability for each bank to be vulnerable. This probability is turned into a binary point forecast
by specifying a threshold above which we signal vulnerability. This threshold is chosen to minimize
a policymaker’s loss function, who has relative preferences between false alarms and missed crises.
Also, we provide a so-called Usefulness measure that captures the performance of the model in
comparison to not having a model (i.e., best guess of a policymaker). We assume in the benchmark
case the policymaker to be more concerned about missing a crisis than giving a false alarm, which
17
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is particularly feasible for internal signals. See Appendix B for more details of the evaluation
measures.
To test to what extent information centrality signals vulnerabilities, and how it relates to bank
size variables, we regress pre-distress events. Hence, as in a standard early-warning setting for
banks, we explain periods 24 months prior to distress with logistic regression. Starting out from
bank importance variables, we can see in Table 2 (Models 1–4) that while none of the variables yield
highly valuable predictions, assets and deposits provide more Usefulness than information centrality,
particularly deposits. The same holds also for statistical significance. Even though the bank size
variables were above shown to explain information centrality, we can observe a difference in their
relation to risk. Large banks in terms of assets are found to be more vulnerable to distress, whereas
large banks in terms of deposits are found to be less so. This is likely to proxy for the business
model or activities of a bank, which might be less risky when the focus is on depository functions.
Moreover, deposits can be seen as a more stable funding source than interbank market or securities
funding. This points to information centrality being a more general measure of interconnectedness,
rather than one defined by the underlying focus of the business model. Further, when we add all
CAMELS variables to the three importance measures (Models 5–8), both Usefulness and statistical
significance points to better explanatory power of assets and deposits. Comparing to models with
only bank importance variables, this moves Usefulness from Ur(µ = 0.9) = 41% at its maximum
to 61% for information centrality and 71% for assets and deposits. Likewise, when adding all
country-specific variables (Models 9–12), we can still observe that the explanatory power of assets
and deposits is higher than that for information centrality. At this stage, we have early-warning
models that capture most of the available Usefulness, by showing a Ur(µ = 0.9) ≥ 91%. When
assessing performance with the Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC) (see
Appendix B for a description), we can see that the same conclusions with respect to performance
hold.
The implication of the two conducted experiments jointly is that information centrality is highly
correlated with bank size, both when measured in total assets and deposits, but not a measure
of vulnerability. This indicates that the measure is not biased by business activities or models,
which might be a factor impacting the vulnerability of a bank. Rather, we are capturing more
broadly importance of a bank in terms of information connectivity in financial discourse. This
property, while due to its broad nature may be a disadvantage, provides ample means for measuring
interconnectedness and centrality from a wider perspective. It is worth remembering that these text-
based networks are not an ending point, but allow further exploration of the semantics of observed
connections.
5. Conclusions
The ongoing global financial crisis has brought interdependencies among banks into focus in try-
ing to assess interconnected and systemic risk.This paper has demonstrated the use of computational
analysis of financial discussion, as a source for information on bank interrelations. Conventional
approaches make use of direct linkages to the extent available and market-based measures as an in-
direct estimate of interdependence, which both have their limitations, such as non-publicly disclosed
information, strong ties to specific business models and deficiencies in the forward-lookingness of
co-movements in markets. The approach we put forward may serve as a complement to more es-
tablished ways of quantifying connectedness and dependence among banks. We have presented a
text-to-network process, which has its basis in co-occurrences of bank names and can be analyzed
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quantitatively and visualized. To support quantification of bank importance, we proposed an infor-
mation centrality measure to rank and assess trends of bank centrality in discussion. Rather than a
common shortest-path-based centrality measure, information centrality captures effects that might
propagate aimlessly by accounting for parallel paths. Moreover, we proposed a method to stabilize
the centrality measure by applying Laplace smoothing to link weights before calculating informa-
tion centrality. To support a qualitative assessment of the bank networks, we put forward a visual,
interactive interface for better illustrating network structures. This concerned not only an interface
to network models, but also an interactive plot to better communicate quantitative network mea-
sures. Our text-based approach was illustrated on European Large and Complex Banking Groups
(LCBGs) during the ongoing financial crisis by quantifying bank interrelations from discussion in
3.0M news articles, spanning the years 2007 to 2014 (Q3).
To better understand the interpretation of and what drives information centrality, we have
explored determinants of the centrality measure. We investigated bank-specific and country-specific
risk drivers, as well as control for variables measuring bank size, and also assess the extent to which
bank risk is explained by information centrality in relation to more standard measures of size. We
have shown that centrality is not a direct measure of vulnerability, despite the fact that it is closely
linked to size variables. The conclusions to be drawn from this are that the centrality measure is not
biased by the nature of business activities or models, which may impact the vulnerability of banks
(e.g., asset size or interbank-lending centrality). Instead, the measure of information centrality
is described to capture the importance of a bank in a wider perspective, in terms of information
connectivity in financial discourse.
Considering the limitations of the current network and that the underlying data occasionally
lead to somewhat hazy patterns difficult to interpret and draw clear conclusions from, we suggest
a number of ways these issues could be addressed in future research. One advantage of using text
data is the potentially rich semantic information it holds, which can be used to better explain or
narrow the relations extracted, thereby facilitating interpretation of the network and the measures
applied on top. A disadvantage of applying such filtering might be that it vastly increases the data
size requirements, quickly reducing a big but sparse data set into a rather scarce one. Similarly, in
this paper we have illustrated how, using a data set of a few million articles, accuracy can still be
improved by even more data.
Although textual data provides the basis for studying interrelationships and other potentially
interesting details on banks more specifically, its interpretation by computational methods is often
challenging. In order to apply filtering by theme to co-occurrence links between banks, we recom-
mend more sophisticated semantic analysis to increase recall. For instance, distributional semantic
methods [35][26] could be used to extend a set of seed keywords, or probabilistic topic modeling [7]
could be applied to the corpus to identify topics of interest and the related subset of articles. Fur-
thermore, combining sentiment analysis with our bank relation extraction could constitute another
interesting way to distinguish the nature of mapped relations. Sentiment analysis has been applied
to classify company-related information from financial news in regards to the effect on their stock
price (e.g., [25]), an approach that could hold considerable potential in the area of systemic risk
analysis as well.
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Appendix A: Data
Table A.1: A list of banks and their labels.
European LCBG and G-SIB European LCBG
Label Name Label Name
Agricole Credit Agricole Groupe ABN-AMRO ABN AMRO Bank NV
BBVA Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argenta Bankia Bankia SA
BPCE Groupe BPCE Commerzbank Commerzbank AG
BNP BNP Paribas CreditMutuel Credit Mutuel Group
Barclays Barclays PLC DZBank DZ Bank AG
CreditSuisse Credit Suisse Group AG Danske Danske Bank A/S
Deutsche Deutsche Bank AG Intesa Intesa Sanpaolo
HSBC HSBC Holdings PLC LaCaixa La Caixa
ING ING Bank NV LandesbankBW Landesbank Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
Nordea Nordea Bank AB Lloyds Lloyds Banking Group PLC
RBS Royal Bank of Scotland Rabobank Rabobank Group
Santander Banco Santander SA
SocGen Group Societe Generale SA
StanChart Standard Chartered PLC
UBS UBS AG
Appendix B: Usefulness of early-warning models
Early-warning models require evaluation criteria that account for the nature of low-probability,
high-impact events. Following Sarlin [31], the signal evaluation framework focuses on a policymaker
with relative preferences between type I and II errors, and the usefulness that she derives by
using a model, in relation to not using it. To mimic an ideal leading indicator, we build a binary
state variable Cj(h) ∈ {0, 1} for observation j (where j = 1, 2, . . . , N) given a specified forecast
horizon h. Let Cj(h) be a binary indicator that is one during pre-crisis periods and zero otherwise.
For detecting events Cj using information from indicators, we estimate the probability of a crisis
occurrence pj ∈ [0, 1], for which we use herein logistic regression. The probability pj is turned into
a binary prediction Pj , which takes the value one if pj exceeds a specified threshold λ ∈ [0, 1] and
zero otherwise. The correspondence between the prediction Pj and the ideal leading indicator Cj
can then be summarized into a so-called contingency matrix.
Table B.1: A contingency matrix.
Actual class Cj
Crisis No crisis
Predicted class Pj
Signal
Correct call False alarm
True positive (TP) False positive (FP)
No signal
Missed crisis Correct silence
False negative (FN) True negative (TN)
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The frequencies of prediction-realization combinations in the contingency matrix are used for
computing a wide range of quantitative measures of classification performance. Beyond measures of
overall accuracy, a policymaker can be thought to be primarily concerned with two types of errors:
issuing a false alarm and missing a crisis. The evaluation framework described below is based upon
that in Sarlin [31] for turning policymakers’ preferences into a loss function, where the policymaker
has relative preferences between type I and II errors. While type I errors represent the share of
missed crises to the frequency of crises T1 ∈ [0, 1] =FN/(TP+FN), type II errors represent the
share of issued false alarms to the frequency of tranquil periods T2 ∈ [0, 1] =FP/(FP+TN). Given
probabilities pj of a model, the policymaker then optimizes the threshold λ such that her loss is
minimized. The loss of a policymaker includes T1 and T2, weighted by relative preferences between
missing crises (µ) and issuing false alarms (1 − µ). By accounting for unconditional probabilities
of crises P1 = P (C = 1) and tranquil periods P2 = P (C = 0) = 1 − P1, the loss function can be
written as follows:
L(µ) = µT1P1 + (1− µ)T2P2 (4)
where µ ∈ [0, 1] represents the relative preferences of missing crises and 1−µ of giving false alarms,
T1 the type I errors, and T2 the type II errors. P1 refers to the size of the crisis class and P2 to
the size of the tranquil class. Further, the Usefulness of a model can be defined in a more intuitive
manner. First, the absolute Usefulness (Ua) is given by:
Ua(µ) = min(µP1, (1− µ)P2)− L(µ), (5)
which computes the superiority of a model in relation to not using any model. As the unconditional
probabilities are commonly unbalanced and the policymaker may be more concerned about the rare
class, a policymaker could achieve a loss of min(µP1, (1− µ)P2) by either always or never signaling
a crisis. This predicament highlights the challenge in building a useful early-warning model: with
an imperfect model, it would otherwise easily pay off for the policymaker to always signal the
high-frequency class.
Second, we can compute the relative Usefulness Ur as follows:
Ur(µ) =
Ua(µ)
min(µP1, (1− µ)P2) , (6)
where Ua of the model is compared with the maximum possible usefulness of the model. That is,
the loss of disregarding the model is the maximum available Usefulness. Hence, Ur reports Ua as
a share of the Usefulness that a policymaker would gain with a perfectly-performing model, which
supports interpretation of the measure.
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